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A Regional Perspective on European Defense
MASSIMO DAL PIAZ
From Parameters, Winter 1994, pp. 57-65.

NATO, the European Union (EU) (through the Western European Union), and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had been the principal institutional players in European security until the United
Nations recently made its presence felt in such matters. Italy in particular, based on a careful reading of Article 11 of
its Constitution, delegated the safeguarding of its own interests to international organizations for nearly half a century.
Until ten years ago NATO had a monopoly on providing security in Europe. But the limits of the Washington Treaty
became evident in the early 1980s when the first Gulf crisis--the war between Iran and Iraq--dramatically underscored
for Europeans the potential reach of events beyond Europe's borders and beyond the Mediterranean. Although such
events may occur outside the geographical scope of the NATO treaty, they can--and have--put the interests of NATO
members at stake.
To offset NATO's reluctance to become involved in "out of area" matters, it was quite natural after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union for the EU to look to the Western European Union (WEU) as the organization most capable of
providing the security framework to safeguard the interests of its member countries. The catchphrase at the time was
"to revitalize the WEU." Security considerations in the climate of East-West confrontation had for a long time required
the diversion of resources to NATO. Without that confrontation, entrusting European defense to the WEU appeared to
some to be more a matter of providing a new structure rather than adjusting the old one. The initiative for the FrancoGerman brigade, now grown to a corps-sized organization involving the forces of five nations (France, Germany,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain), is one consequence of the search for an alternative to NATO.
Another contributor to European security has been the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE,
established in 1972 as a proposal of the former Warsaw Pact countries, was to set the final seal on the map of Europe
as drawn at Yalta. As the transformation of Europe was taking place, the CSCE itself underwent a change in mission.
The three principal decisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act set in train initiatives that eventually encouraged and
accelerated the pace of change in Europe. The human rights initiative undoubtedly helped establish the new
democracies in Europe. The economic initiative served to foster development and trade and contributed to recent
events related to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The security initiative paved the way--through
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the process for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM)-for the remarkable changes that led to the Warsaw Pact's demise and the end of the Cold War. Thus, the genesis and
outcomes of these processes were fundamentally different from the intentions of those who had established the CSCE.
With the 1990-91 Gulf War, the United Nations has sought to assume the role of guarantor of world security. Until that
time, problems susceptible to being solved were dealt with through Moscow-Washington channels, which left to the
UN the role of peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the Charter. With the emergence of the United States as the only
surviving superpower, consensus and legitimacy for US initiatives has been sought in the only forum chartered to grant
them: the UN.
Against this backdrop of intertwining initiatives and changes, the maelstrom of upheavals in the East, and the recurring
and violent out-of-area crises which draw ever nearer to the heart of Europe, we need to examine the machinery
actually at our disposal to meet all these challenges. National roles should be assessed in light of each international
organization's ability to protect common interests.
NATO and Other International Organizations
NATO has at times appeared to be constrained by the boundaries set by the Washington Treaty, despite its declared

willingness to support peacekeeping operations in the framework of the CSCE and the UN. Recent events have
demonstrated that the UN resolutions against Serbia would not have been enforced were it not for NATO. The NATO
Alliance is a uniquely credible institution which can rely on a functioning integrated command and control system to
carry out peace-enforcing operations without fielding ground troops--at least for the time being.
NATO was the only reliable alternative when it came to enforcing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 836,
which provided the basis for NATO's ultimatum to Serbia. Thanks to its sufficiently broad international membership,
NATO alone conveys the perception that the operation in Bosnia is truly multinational, aimed only at making peace.
The WEU and the CSCE, by contrast, have no geographical constraints, but they lack effectiveness as well as the
resources and structures to carry out any plan they or others might devise. The CSCE in particular has a weak structure
compared to its broad membership base. For the present at least, the CSCE has less utility than the WEU for enforcing
the will of its members. This is demonstrated by Europe's vacillation in crises such as the one in Yugoslavia, which
was born, nurtured, and matured before the eyes of a disbelieving Europe.
The UN, unique among supranational organizations, can develop the broad consensus needed to deal with many
regional issues. But despite the advantages of seeking UN initiatives to settle such issues, the absence of a functioning
UN military structure has proven to be a crippling liability. The UN must therefore rely on the countries or
organizations that are able and willing to support it. One result of this situation is a chronic distortion in its
decisionmaking procedures. Without an effective military staff group, the Secretary General or his appointed
representative on the scene issues instructions directly to the force commander, a procedure being followed in the
former Yugoslavia. It was also the preferred means of doing business in Somalia and in Mozambique. This procedure
can be effective in purely humanitarian operations (distribution of food, medicines, and other goods to a civilian
population, for example), but it is ineffective if events dictate a transition to operations that could require the use of
force. When the shift from Chapter VI to Chapter VII operations occurs, neither the Secretary General nor his personal
representative on the scene is in a position to translate political guidelines into orders to the force commander; those
orders must take into account the precise terms and conditions established when each nation agreed to provide forces
for a UN operation.
Another development is that UN-flagged NATO operations in Europe immediately involve Russia, as in Bosnia. The
same could happen in the so-called "gray belt," the former Warsaw Pact area. If taken lightly, this aspect of UN
operations risks adding new destabilizing elements in a Europe which already has its fill of challenges to stability. One
example will suffice: the UN/NATO ultimatum to Serbia entailed the acceptance of 400 Russian paratroopers on
Bosnian soil under the UN banner. So Russia, a country which has traditional and cultural links to the Serbs, and
which has frequently brought pressure to bear on the Balkans, now has a military presence there. But more than that,
its presence in the region during a period of domestic instability could aggravate the underlying tensions that
precipitated the intervention.
A Common Goal
Europe now needs to unite in employing existing international organizations.
To develop a strong sense of common purpose, and to plan and carry out joint and combined operations, the first idea
that comes naturally to mind is the establishment of links among the UN, NATO, the CSCE, and the WEU. This would
entail an attempt to pool their staff operations, resources, experiences, and goals in order to converge on a statement of
purpose and a set of objectives that could be supported by all these organizations. Many Europeans are well aware of
the great differences existing among the organizations--such as in the procedures to achieve consensus on political
decisions, or in the often disparate contributions each organization requires of its members. Realistically, however, we
cannot expect any of the four organizations to adopt the decisions, projects, or even the statement of principles of the
others. The reasons are manifold; the most important in this case may be that over the past two years the map of
Europe has been redrawn more than once, and the latest edition may not be the last.
NATO has certainly been the quickest to respond to these changes in the makeup of Europe. It has embarked on a
fundamental review of its strategy and its command and force structures. One result has been the creation of the ACE
Rapid Reaction Corps, which features a strong European participation and is commanded by the UK. With regard to

the "Partnership for Peace," it is an undertaking of wide scope, whose intent is to accommodate the needs of many
countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Yet NATO retains its sense of purpose and its commitment to common
defense, in contrast to suggestions to the contrary in the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
The swift and necessary reshaping of NATO, however, did not take place in concert with the other European security
organizations; NATO already enjoyed a solid structure at the end of 1990 when its review process began, while the
WEU and the CSCE were still in search of their separate identities and common perspectives on defense.
The reshaping of NATO has not been easy. While the transformation of NATO was in process (and it has still to be
completed in many respects), the NATO countries in northern and central Europe were reluctant to shift their attention,
and the NATO focus as well, to the south. They were naturally inclined to adhere to previously held concepts that
ascribed to some countries, such as Germany, far greater influence than other countries in the NATO decisionmaking
structure, even in regard to the Southern Region. It is not that the importance of those northern and central states has
diminished; rather, the relative significance of other countries in the defense debates has increased.
When the focus of crisis shifted from Eastern Europe to the Balkans, Italy, from its position astride the Mediterranean
(which it divides and controls), became the base for NATO operations in and around Bosnia--air, naval, and even land
if circumstances should dictate. But so long as the greatest risks to European security emanate from the east, the
commitment of NATO's southern countries, Italy included, is required to prevent a period of vulnerability and
uncertainty about regional security.
The WEU, feeling that new responsibilities were demanded of it and seeking to leave the sideline to which it had been
relegated during the Cold War, has tried to develop a more prominent role in European security matters. Under WEU
auspices, France and Germany have sought leverage through the Franco-German Corps ("Eurocorps," as Paris and
Bonn like to call it). As originally conceived, this unit was to involve forces and missions which were not compatible
with those of NATO. Subsequently Paris and Bonn clarified their position, at least in part, by agreeing that this
formation would fall under the operational command of the SACEUR when engaged in NATO missions.
The establishment of the Eurocorps had the merit of highlighting, at a time when debate within the international
organizations was at a standstill, that while multilateral diplomacy may be preferred when guided by strong and proven
leadership (as in NATO), sound decisions could nonetheless be made through bilateral initiatives. One benefit of
bilateral negotiations is that they often can work as a catalyst and an accelerator for decisions to be made within the
major multinational organizations.
It would seem that prospects for any "multinational" initiative after the 1990 London NATO Summit Declaration have
faded as officials try to piece together military formations suitable to the organizations vying for primacy in European
security matters. NATO is on the right track to succeed in this enterprise, although considerable effort remains before
NATO can declare success. There are reasonable doubts that other European organizations, in which regional interests
are paramount, can ever succeed to the degree that NATO has. Such interests, particularly those related to out-of-area
matters, which require less effort to develop consensus among neighboring nations, obviously prevail over more
general interests. So it is that the French and the Germans have set themselves common goals in Central Europe, with
normally skeptical British and Dutch support. To the south, an agreement is imminent among Italy, France, and Spain,
whose common interests have strengthened with time.
Analysis of NATO-WEU coordination and the activities of the WEU military planning cell demonstrates the failure of
multilateral diplomacy. There is still no institutionalized forum for NATO-WEU political coordination. The planning
cell remains what it is, nothing more than a "cell," without an integrated military command or even an effective staff
counterpart to NATO's International Staff. Notwithstanding the initial enthusiasm inspired by this initiative, there are
now doubts about its effectiveness.
Awareness of the difficulties inherent in multilateral diplomacy may have altered the NATO objective of expansion to
the former Warsaw Pact countries. If pressures to do so--mostly from the Germans--had prevailed, it would be
extremely difficult today to achieve a consensus within NATO. This outcome highlights the obstacles that the CSCE,
with its much broader representation, will face if it does not succeed in finding appropriate objectives and support for

its initiatives.
After the "Paris Charter for a New Europe" was signed in 1990, the CSCE began a process of institutionalizing its
programs. One step was to set up a Council of Ministers, along the lines of NATO, with permanent representatives and
supporting staffs. Once that process concludes, the CSCE will have a capability for improved dialogue with the other
European institutions, provided that its decisionmaking machinery is compatible with theirs. As a matter of principle,
dialogue is possible only among institutions which make decisions on the same subjects in comparable periods with
compatible organizational structures. European nations have had years of experience in aligning their individual
national security processes to NATO's way of doing business. It is unlikely that they will try to accommodate the
tempos of two more multinational groups as well.
What Should We Do?
If Europe is to assume responsibilities in the defense field, we must have a clear picture of the political goals we
intend to set for ourselves.
First, Europe can operate as a "sub-level" of NATO because emerging crises, whether out-of-area or in regions
contiguous to NATO nations, require timely, gradual, and credible responses. In Bosnia--and maybe also in Croatia
and Slovenia--it would have been better to intervene in the early stages of the fighting under the NATO banner, but on
a European scale based on political decisions shared with the United States. By doing so, the involvement of Russia
probably could have been avoided. The questions for similar future challenges become: "by which means?" and "under
whose leadership?" For example, if we postulate a European defense system, the issue of its leadership cannot
continue to be linked to the provision of US resources as a conditio sine qua non. On the other hand, either the
leadership issue is resolved because the European countries are willing to find a European identity or we will let crises
worsen, as in the Bosnian case, by increasing the number of interacting agents (Russia enters the scene) without the
assurance that the crisis can be resolved. Such ad hoc policymaking creates a high potential for unintended
consequences far more significant for Europe than the outcome of the crisis itself.
Second, we are building a united Europe on the basis of equality. So, while shared responsibilities and the allocation of
certain roles and functions has become easier since the Cold War, equality could prove to be a disadvantage in matters
affecting security. The military organization required for an effective partnership requires a mission, forces to perform
that mission, and strong leadership to guide those forces. Leadership in security matters in the new Europe is a
particularly complex issue, especially for Europeans long accustomed to having the United States in that role, and
especially since the configuration of a military decisionmaking structure immediately conveys the idea of each
country's political weight. It is clear that if we want equality within the European security structure, leadership within
that structure will have to be clearly defined and continuously exercised.
It would be unrealistic to think that if economic leadership exists within a coalition, it does not lead to political and
eventually military leadership. And the line separating leadership in all areas and regional supremacy is almost too
narrow to define. Hence the process of developing a European defense system introduces the possibility of leadership
capable of bypassing the political agreements that underpin the defense system itself. Conversely, we cannot renounce
the concept of a European defense policy. These circumstances create a fundamental dilemma for the WEU and CSCE
in defense matters.
Third, a clear and established political division of defense roles is necessary. This division must remain linked to
geographical areas and their associated risks. In this sense, the division of Europe into Northern Europe, Central
Europe, and Southern Europe is still valid.
In the north, Great Britain has a natural function to control and protect the polar and North Atlantic routes, the straits
and the coasts of mainland Europe. In the center, Germany, the pivot between northern and southern Europe, helps to
contain instabilities originating in the east and has much to contribute to controlling the conditions that create
instability there. In the south, Italy, with its northern frontiers in the heart of the European subcontinent and its foot in
the middle of the Mediterranean, retains its undiminished importance as an outpost and a link with the most unstable
areas of the continent. Each of these three countries plays a role which cannot and must not be avoided. Were one of
them to fail, one of the other two would have to assume the responsibility for safeguarding a second area or, worse, the

remaining two might become involved in a struggle over that responsibility.
Disruption of this natural evolution to sub-regional responsibilities could lead to an imbalance which could in turn
rekindle rivalries among the north, center, and south of Europe, with unimaginable consequences. Therefore, if a
single operational military command is necessary, it is also necessary to break it down into interdependent subregional headquarters. This division will in turn produce the appropriate command structure for forces based on the
geographical location of an emerging crisis--north, south, or center.
Fourth, of perhaps equal importance, the recent trend toward interventions at the request of troubled states or on behalf
of the populations of so-called "failed states" poses a real challenge to NATO and to the organizations that seek to
complement NATO or replace it. The unique characteristics of out-of-area operations, a fringe issue during much of
the Cold War, must now be dealt with effectively. Our inability to meet this challenge successfully as the former
Yugoslavia was dissolving cannot dissuade us from applying the lessons of that situation in a creative and constructive
fashion. Establishment of the Eurocorps is one form of response; unfettered by the constraints in the NATO Charter,
this organization has the potential to go a long way to providing the military means of responding to out-of-area
issues. Political will and leadership will determine its effectiveness in the next such crisis.
All these elements will have to be assimilated and harmonized in a broad forum, one in which differences can be
ironed out fairly and expeditiously. This means coordination within and among NATO, WEU in the broader UN
context, and the CSCE. Effective coordination will promote stability and will foster confidence that future
interventions will serve common interests rather than the individual interests of participating countries.
These aspects of the emerging political-military structure of Europe can be developed only by collective political
agreements. In this sense, technical military agreements, either bilateral or multilateral, while perhaps necessary, are
clearly not sufficient to shape a European response to future challenges. Indeed, they can produce the opposite effect if
they are interpreted as a sign of the political absence of one or more parties essential to the agreement. Instead, it is
political agreements that reflect and safeguard the role of each individual country. Therefore, the military chain of
command must at all times be subordinate to a joint military body, with that body in turn subordinate to a joint
political body--not only within NATO but also within the UN, WEU, and other institutions. This joint political body
would be the forum for political and political-military decisions and for coordination, first at the political, then at
military level, with other European organizations. Only this organizational concept will provide reasonable assurance
that national identity and interests will be reflected in international commitments. Nothing less will enable Europe to
face the issues of the next century, the shapes of which can already be seen in outline, if not in detail.
Conclusion
Future European defense policy should be based on the following broad principles:
compatibility among all organizations committed to security, in order to reinforce strengths and compensate for
weaknesses among participating nations
best use of the resources already earmarked by coordinating the activities of existing structures, thereby avoiding
further dilution of European responses to matters of mutual concern
a commitment to parity among partners, particularly in regard to national positions on matters both known and
unpredictable
It is evident that if one of the three principles is ignored or abandoned the other two alone will not produce a balanced
European defense policy. The opposite result--in the form of a bitter debate--is more likely to follow the failure of one
of the three. Such an outcome would create anxiety about the principle of mutual support in defense matters and would
inevitably contaminate political, economic, and social discussions as well.
The UN, NATO, WEU, and CSCE decisionmaking bodies should have a capability for timely dialogue at appropriate
decisionmaking levels, especially when they deal with peace management, crisis prevention, and crisis management.
To be successful the dialogue must be conducted by nations on equal footing. These mechanisms cannot be a matter of
improvisation: it is the habit of coordination, first at the political and then at the military level, that will create a sound
and sure basis for responding to crises. Once these mechanisms have been created, it will be easier to put in place the

machinery for the management of conflicts. Finally, only when this political framework has become clear will we have
an accurate picture of the military structure that can ensure and strengthen, rather than threaten and weaken, stability in
Europe.
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